Arrested Development: Failing the By-Gone Utopia of the Australian Republic
For a generation of constitutional republicans, 1999 marks a ‘sliding doors’ moment many of us weren’t even alive to see. Of course, I am referencing the Australian ‘republic referendum’, a blueprint forged from enduring, 19th-century ambition, yet nonetheless foiled at the hands of perceived obligation. As we approach nearly thirty years since the referendum’s failure on the grandest stage, surveying the recent coups calling to further unionise the global ‘middle powers’, I cannot help but feel we as a country have partly squandered the first quarter of this century, at least at the geo-political level. In spite of the dwindling influence of the West writ large, Australia’s monarchist ties continue to leave the country in a position of unspoken, ingrained cultural subservience to a Crown waning even in its own dominion. For a nation so far removed from its historical coloniser, both geographically and politically—the latter increasingly so—this want of legitimisation is unsettling, though it seems unlikely to desist.
Putting aside the obvious influence of the dismissal, much of the republican swell of the ‘60s and ‘70s benefited from global advancements in technology, specifically the changing nature of public communication, and its impact on political rhetoric. With this growing capability came the erosion of many of the excuses sustaining the cultural status quo. International (especially transpacific) communication became cheaper; diplomacy more cutting-edge; seafaring faster and more reliable, opening the gate for more lucrative free-trade agreements. Not only had Australia’s increased involvement in the Asian and South-Pacific markets become more viable as a matter of capability and commerce, but, in giving the country a taste for true agency on the international plane, it also helped to reawaken the nation’s appetite for formal independence. Fortunately for those sympathetic to the republican cause, now in a time of relative political stability, the nation once again had the capacity to litigate issues considered political luxuries.
This position was one keenly adopted by then-Prime Minister, Paul Keating, who, after observing the 1980s’ political ubiquity with concerns over the economy, “linked Australia’s independence to Australia’s economic future in Asia”. Critically, as illustrates my point above, the Australian’s Paul Kelly (a public talisman in favour of the republic) opined that “any trading nation worth its salt—Japan and Germany are modern examples—has had a robust sense of self-identity.” Come 1991, after a brief recess effected by the demands of the Cold War, this cocktail of cultural angst piqued with the Keating-government’s (i) formal incorporation of republicanism as a key policy agenda, and (ii) establishment of the Australian Republican Movement (‘ARM’), a peak body headed-up by future Prime Minister, a platform ironically acquired through his leadership of the LNP notwithstanding his vociferous and enduring republican convictions, Malcolm Turnbull.
Sufficed to say, despite what was estimated by pollsters to be a convincing mandate of the Australian public, Keating and Turnbull’s brainchild whiffed spectacularly at the very moment it most needed to hold strong—a misfire often attributed to convoluted messaging as a result of the campaign’s factional divide. This is a critical point to emphasise, as it illustrates much of the concern underpinning any contemporary calls for the cause’s re-litigation. That is, any perceived mandate or anecdotal groundswell of support for Australia’s constitutional emancipation comes stained with the awareness that ‘appetite’ only does so much of the heavy lifting. In large part, this also explains the degree of cynicism plaguing modern branches of the cause, as the main litmus test for viability—support polled at a general level—has proven an unreliable yardstick. This is not to mention the difficulty republican lobbyists face in warming the (presumably ALP) government of the day up to the prospect of once again staking its legacy on a referendum; lest we forget the Voice to Parliament, a key policy whiff (one sullied in form, not in substance, I must add) that would appear to have scorned the Albanese Government past the point of throwing those dice for a second time. With these barriers proving prohibitive to the birth of the Australian republic in the foreseeable future, our failure to vindicate the egalitarian aspirations of past generations when given the chance seems to grow in consequence year-on-year. It might be true that those at the helm, such as Keating and Turnbull, fell victim to hubris; indeed, I would hardly reject the argument that the campaign leaned too heavily upon ‘vibes’, chief among those being hope, change, and the fruition of decades-old dreams of the future we had felt destined to inherit. At the same time, resorting back to a political climate where the ‘the future’ (whether that be of culture, technology, national values, etc.) felt like some distant, alien possibility, not like something we had already had and squandered. Unfortunately, the latter is the reality, both with respect to visions of the republic and to the broader connotations that those now in custody of ‘the future’ have failed to bring it to fruition.
In 1996, historian Mark McKenna prophesied the future of republicanism in Australia. As if from the mouth of Nostradamus himself, he wrote that the history of the cause throughout the 21st century would be the story of Australia’s success or failure in grappling with the dilemma which it was ‘inevitably’ bound to confront from the moment Governor Arthur Phillip took possession of the colony of New South Wales in 1788 in the name of the Crown.
Thirty years on, as we make similar enquiries about the prospects of the Australian republic, the post-referendum hangover seems to endure. We must hope that the current aspirations of the republic do not end up parodied by hindsight. Thus, despite appearing overdue for the better part of a century, the Australian public seems destined to remain in stasis due to its misfires, banking on a future government accruing enough political cache to deem the juice worth the squeeze.
Bibliography
[1] Mark McKenna, The Captive Republic: A History of Republicanism in Australia 1788-1996 (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 252.
[1] Ibid 253.
[1] Specifically in circumstances where the republic saw its President be directly elected, see Andrew McDonald, Changing States, Changing Nations: Constitutional Reform and National Identity in the Late Twentieth Century (Bloomsbury, 1st ed, 2021) 153. See also the sentiment generally espoused in Malcolm Turnbull, Fighting for the Republic: The Ultimate Insider’s Account (Hardie Grant, 1st ed, 1999).
[1] This being tactfully explored in John Higley and Ian McAllister, ‘Elite Division and Voter Confusion: Australia’s Republic Referendum in 1999’ (2002) 41(6) European Journal of Political Research 845. See generally McDonald (n 3) 168.
[1] McKenna (n 1) 263.
